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Résumé / Abstract
Les économistes ont beaucoup critiqué la réglementation qui impose des
normes environnementales uniformes à des usines qui peuvent différer tant en terme
de coûts marginaux de la diminution de la pollution quen terme des fonctions de
dommage marginal. De tels critiques ignorent toutefois que limplantation de
normes peut varier de manière significative dune usine à lautre, ce qui se traduit
par des normes qui, en fait, ne sont pas uniformes. Le but de cet article est
danalyser les déterminants des activités de contrôle du législateur, et les facteurs
qui expliquent la décision dinspecter ou non la performance environnementale
dune usine. Nous démontrons que les législateurs sont sensibles aux dommages
environnementaux lorsquils prennent la décision dinspecter une usine spécifique
et que de plus grands efforts dinspection, ceteris paribus, sont consacrés aux usines
qui sont susceptibles de créer les dommages les plus importants. Dun autre côté,
nous démontrons également que les comportements du législateur sont aussi
fonction de variables qui ne peuvent être reliées directement aux coûts de la
réduction de la pollution et aux dommages environnementaux. En particulier, nous
démontrons que les variables liées aux conditions locales du marché du travail ont
un impact sur la stratégie de contrôle adoptée par le législateur. Ces résultats
fournissent un support, à la fois à la théorie de lintérêt public, et à la théorie
économique de la réglementation.
Economists have greatly criticized regulations that impose uniform
environmental standards on plants which may differ in terms both of their
marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Such a critic ignores
however that the implementation of the standards may vary significantly across
plants thus giving rise in fact to non-uniform standards. The purpose of this
paper is to analyze the determinants of the regulators monitoring activities, and
the factors which explains the decision to inspect or not to inspect a plants
environmental performance. We show that regulators are sensitive to
environmental damages in their decision to inspect specific plants and that
greater inspection effort, ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose
emissions are likely to generate a higher level of damages. On the other hand,
we also show that the behavior of the regulator is also a function of variables
that may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. In particular,
we show that variables pertaining to local labor market conditions have an
impact on the monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator. These results
provide support to both the public interest and economic theory of regulation.
Mots Clés : Pollution, environnement, contrôle, réglementation, pâte et papier
Keywords : Pollution, Environment, Monitoring, Enforcement, Regulation,
Pulp and Paper
JEL : L51, L73
11. Introduction
Economists have greatly criticized environmental regulations that impose on
polluters uniform environmental standards since such standards ignore that
plants face non-uniform marginal abatement cost, as well as non-uniform
marginal damage functions. However, the presence of uniform standards
does not necessarily imply uniform compliance with the standards. The
nature of the monitoring and enforcement activities performed by the
regulator ultimately determines the extent of pollution control undertaken by
the plants and their level of compliance with the regulation.
1
If compliance
with the terms of the regulation imposes any net cost on a plant, its behavior
is likely to diverge from the desired one unless the cost of compliance is
smaller than the expected cost of non-compliance.
2
It has been increasingly recognized that resources devoted to the monitoring
of the regulated community and the enforcement of environmental standards
are insufficient, and that these activities are seriously lacking.
3
The regulator
therefore has to allocate its limited resources to perform a small number of
compliance activities. Silverman (1990) writes: Because of limited resources
and the resulting need to establish priorities, each EPA program at agency
headquarters in Washington D.C. has developed compliance monitoring
plans and enforcement response policies. These strategies generally direct
the most intensive efforts to those segments of the regulated community most
likely to be in non-compliance (p. 95; italics ours). In the context, the use of
1
Russell (1990) defines monitoring as checking up on whether those covered by the law and
regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden to) them. (p. 243)
Enforcement is defined as taking actions that force violators to mend their ways and that provide
visible examples to encourage others in the regulated population to maintain desired behavior to
avoid a similar fate. (p. 243)
2
Penalties for non-compliance may take various forms, including legal costs, fines, loss of
reputation, etc. For more details, see Dewees (1990), Hamilton (1995), Lanoie and Laplante (1994),
and Muoghalu et al. (1990).
3
Russell (1990) writes: What is missing is a commitment of resources to checking up on whether
those covered by the law and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden)
them (p. 243). See also General Accounting Office (1993), and OConnor (1994).
2the word generally takes a special importance since it represents an
implicit recognition that universal compliance may not be the objective of the
regulator. Similarly in Canada, upon evaluating the results of the National
Inspection Plan, Environment Canada found that all regulations did not
require the same level of compliance verification, and decided on a target-
oriented approach (Canada, 1992, p. 38).
Surprisingly, issues pertaining to the monitoring and enforcement of
environmental standards has been the object of very few empirical analysis.
4
Magat and Viscusi (1990) have estimated the impact of inspections on the
self-reported discharges of biological oxygen demand (BOD) of pulp and
paper plants in the United States, and found that each inspection reduces
permanently reported discharges by approximately 20%. More recently,
Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have found that not only inspections but also
the threat of an inspection has a strong negative impact on reported
emissions. Both analyses also found that inspections induce more frequent
reporting from the plants.
5
Given that inspections may induce plants to improve their environmental
performance, it is of interest to understand the process leading the regulator
to undertake monitoring activities. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
determinants of the regulators decision to monitor (or not to monitor) a
plants environmental performance. In particular, we have built a measure of
environmental damages to test whether or not greater inspection effort,
ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose emissions are likely
4
We note,along with Cropper and Oates (1992), that most of the literature in environmental
economics simply makes the (implicit or explicit) assumption that polluters comply with the
regulation. Research effort on monitoring and enforcement issues has been for the most part
theoretical (see for example, Beavis and Dobbs (1987), Linder and McBride (1984), and Russell et
al. (1986)). Fisheries have attracted a certain number of empirical analysis (among others, see
Furlong (1991), and Sutinen and Andersen (1985)).
5
See also Fearnley et al. (1995).
3to generate a higher level of damages. On the other hand, we also test
whether or not the behavior of the regulator is a function of variables that
may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. We are
particularly interested in testing whether or not variables pertaining to local
labor market conditions (e.g. regional unemployment) has an impact on the
monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator.
The paper most closely related to ours is Deily and Gray (1991).
6
Using
solely the economic (or positive) theory of regulation as a reference model
(Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976)), they analyze whether or not local labor
market conditions affect the enforcement of environmental standards.
7
In
particular, they analyze whether or not EPAs enforcement actions are a
function of the probability that a plant closes as a result of these actions
instead of complying with the regulation. In a recent paper, Deily and Gray
(1996) also use the economic theory of regulation to model the regulators
enforcement decision. As will be shown in Section III, we obtain results
converse to those obtained by Deily and Gray. Moreover, unlike Deily and
Gray (1991, 1996) who did not perform such a test, we show that greater
inspection efforts are directed towards those plants most likely to cause
higher levels of damages. This result lends support to the public interest (or
normative) theory of regulation (Posner, 1974).
Given the limited number of empirical analysis in this area of research, we
view our analysis as broadening further our understanding of the regulators
behavior with respect to the monitoring and enforcement of environmental
standards. Our results indicate that unlike standards, the implementation of
those standards is not uniform. To the extent that higher expected damages
6
Interestingly, Deily and Gray assert that their paper is the first empirical study of the EPAs
enforcement activity at the plant level (p. 260).
7
This theory stipulates that there is a supply and demand of regulation, and that the government
chooses the amount of regulation so as to maximize its political support.
4lead to a greater probability of inspections, actual standards may be closer to
optimality than would suggest the regulation. Moreover, given the
specificities of our model, the current paper extends Deily and Grays
analysis (1991, 1996) to a test of the validity of the competing theories of
regulation when applied to environmental issues.
8
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss in more details
our model, estimation startegy, and the nature of our dataset. We present our
results in Section III and conclude in Section IV.
2. Model, estimation and dataset
(i) Model
Our purpose is to analyse the factors that explain the regulators decision to
monitor a plants environmental performance. Assume that a regulation is in
place which restricts discharges of a given subset of industrial polluters (as
most environmental standards are industry specific). Assume moreover that
limited resources are devoted to monitoring compliance with the regulation.
How is the regulator going to allocate its monitoring resources? As suggested
by Silverman (1990), the regulator may wish to allocate its resources to
maximise the rate of compliance with the regulation. If such is an objective,
monitoring activities would obviously be a function of a plants compliance
history. In particular, a high frequency of non-compliance may trigger an
inspection by the regulator. However, such a strategy would presume that
compliance is equally desirable regardless of the impact of a plants
emissions on the environment. It would ignore that the impact of a plants
emissions is a function of the specificities of the environment in which they
are discharged.
8
To our knowledge, such a test has only been performed by Kaserman et al. (1993).
5With respect to effluent discharges, for any given concentration of
conventional pollutants (such as BOD and total suspended solids (TSS)), the
environmental impact is a function of the flow of the effluents relative to the
flow of the river in which the effluent is discharged: ceteris paribus, the
greater the river flow, the smaller the environmental impact. Hence, given
that the impact of a unit of pollution may vary considerably across locations,
the regulator may wish to allocate its resources not so much as to increase
compliance with the regulation but instead to minimise environmental
damages. This behavior would support the public interest (or normative)
theory of regulation which, applied to this particular instance, would explain
environmental regulation as an instrument that corrects market failure and
increases social welfare (Posner, 1974). Given this interpretation of the
regulation, the regulators monitoring strategy would, ceteris paribus, be
explicitly affected by the fact that damages are heterogeneous across
locations, and at least implicitly would allow higher discharges (through
lower probabilities of inspections) in locations where damages are smaller.
However, other variables may also affect the regulators behavior. If one
espouses the economic (or positive) theory of regulation, the regulator would
allocate monitoring resources so as to maximize net political suport. On this
basis, Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) predict that local employment conditions
would particularly influence enforcement actions. Enforcement actions in
Deily and Gray include letters, phone calls, penalties, enforcement orders,
inspections, etc. Monitoring activities (e.g. inspections) are not differentiated
from enforcement activities (e.g. orders and fines). In particular, they predict
that plants in high unemployment areas would be the target of a smaller
number of enforcement actions than plants in lower unemployment areas.
However, somewhat surprisingly they find that plants in high-
6unemployment counties are facing more enforcement actions than fewer.
(1991, p. 269).
Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) also predict that large plants (relative to the
community labor force) would face a smaller number of enforcement actions
since it may prove too costly for the regulator to disrupt a large proportion of
the labor force (where the cost is measured in terms of political support). An
alternative view however is that in order to maximize political support, the
regulator may trade-off the support of those concerned with environmental
quality with those whose income is an important function of the economic
activity generated by the presence of a large (polluting) plant. Support from
an environmentally aware community may be obtained by the undertaking of
visible monitoring activities such as inspections, (irrespective of whether or
not these inspections give rise to enforcement actions), while support from
the group who benefits largely from the presence of the plant may be
obtained by engaging into less enforcement actions. Hence, unlike Deily and
Gray, we therefore predict that the visibility of the plants may affect the
probability that it being monitored: the greater the visibility (measured as the
importance of the plant in the local labor market), the larger the probability
of inspections. Whether or not large plants in the local labor market face a
smaller or a larger number of monitoring actions therefore remains an
empirical issue.
Following the preceding discussion, we therefore seek to explain the
regulators monitoring activities by using a model specification which
includes variables that could support both the normative and positive theory
of regulation:
7MONITORING = f (LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, DAMAGE
OF POLLUTION, COMPLIANCE, CONTROL VARIABLES)
(ii) Estimation strategy and data
For the purpose of our econometric analysis, we use plant-level monthly data from
the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. The industry is a major contributor to
Quebecs economic activity and is also its most important source of conventional
pollutants, producing approximately 60% of the total BOD load produced by the
manufacturing industry in Quebec. In Canada, jurisdiction over water pollution
control is shared by the federal and provincial governments. The basis of the
overlap relies on the Constitution Act of 1867. Insofar as water pollution is
concerned, the federal government has played an important role through its
"Fisheries Act" under which it has introduced the "Pulp and Paper Effluent
Regulations" in 1971. Similarly, the government of Quebec, pursuant to its
"Environmental Quality Act", has introduced the "Règlement sur les fabriques de
pâtes at papiers" in 1981. As of May 1992, new federal and provincial
regulations were introduced for the pulp and paper industry whereby new
emission standards for TSS, BOD, toxicity, dioxins and furans have been defined.
However, for the period covered by our sample of data (1985-1991 inclusively),
only the Quebec regulation contained standards for BOD and TSS (and not for
toxicity). These standards are uniform and apply equally to every plant in the
industry. A plant's compliance with the regulation is assessed by comparing the
allowable discharge with the total load reported by the plant.
9
Though 60 plants
were in production over the period of analysis, a complete dataset was available
for only 46 of those plants.
10
A total of 63 sampling inspections have been
9
For more details, see Laplante and Rilstone (1996).
10
Observations were missing from the monthly reports filed by the plants. In a number of cases, the
neglect to report seemed to be unsystematic. These observations were treated as randomly missing
and were replaced by forecasts from 12th-order univariate autoregressions. This left us with 46 of the
60 plants. As for the plants not included in our dataset, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have shown
that the failure to report does not appear to be the result of a strategic behavior from the plants.
8performed by the regulator over the period of analysis.
11
However, due to the
exclusion of 14 plants, we retain 56 of the 63 inspections.
Let us turn to the variables used to estimate the above equation. The definition,
mean, and standard deviation of the variables are provided in Table 1. The
dependent variable, MONITORING, is captured by a sampling inspection by the
environmental authorities (INSP); it takes a value of 1 when there is an inspection
and 0 otherwise.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ]
The LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS are captured by a vector of three
variables similar to those used by Deily and Gray. First, EMPL is defined as the
ratio of employment at the plant to employment in the local labor market.
12
Following our previous discussion, we expect a positive effect of this variable on
the probability of an inspection: the larger the plant in the regional labor market,
the more visible is the regulators monitoring activities in the community.
Political support may thus be more favorable from the constituents for whom
environmental protection is an important determinant of their political support.
Second, UNEMPL is the regional unemployment rate as defined and measured by
Statistic Canada. Third, AGE represents the age of the plant. It reflects
(admittedly crudely) the costs that a plant could face if non-compliance was
detected, and therefore the potential impact on employment if a large plant is
requested to reduce its emissions. We expect that each of these last two variables
will have a negative impact on the probability of an inspection.
11
A sampling inspection is an inspection where the regulator samples the plant's effluents and measures the
content of the samples. Other types of monitoring activities are also performed (see Magat and Viscusi (1990,
p.338) for more details). We have tried to document monitoring activities other than sampling inspections.
However,in Quebec, during the period considered, monitoring activities were performed on a regional basis
and it proved impossible to obtain comparable information across regions. It does remain the case that
sampling inspections are the regulator's ultimate device to assess compliance with the standard and give
credibility to the self-reporting procedure.
12
The size of the local labor market is defined as the labor force within 100 km from the plant.
9As a measure of the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION, we use 4 different variables:
FLOW, ORGANO, POP, and ZONE. The variable FLOW represents the flow of
the plants effluent relative to the river flow. Conversations with experts in the
Quebec Ministry of the Environment assured us that such a variable captures in a
simple and reasonable way the potential of a plants effluent to cause
environmental damages. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the
probability of inspection: the larger the FLOW variable, the greater the potential
for damages, and the higher the probability of an inspection. While this variable
may capture the potential for conventional pollutants to cause damages, it ignores
that the potential for organochlorides such as dioxins and furans to cause damages
may not be affected in a same manner by the river flow. We have thus introduced
the variable ORGANO which takes the value 1 if a plants effluents contains such
pollutants.
While emissions of pollutants likely reduce water ambient quality, the damages
suffered from such reduction are a function of the various uses that can be made of
the water. Ideally, we would have liked to estimate the economic value of the
portion of the river affected by the plants discharges and predict that the higher
this value, the larger the probability of an inspection. Given the large number of
rivers in which the plants in our sample are discharging, such an exercise would
not have been feasible. Following discussion with the Ministry of the
Environment, we have decided to consider as a proxy for damages, the population
of the city in which the plant is located, only to the extent that the plant
discharges its effluent upstream the location of the population (POPUL). If the
plants outlet(s) is located downstream the city, the variable takes the value 0.
13
13
Short of measuring the economic value of the river, we wished to estimate the number of people
living within a given distance (e.g. 15 km) downstream the plants discharge point(s). However, the required
distance would itself have been a function of the river flow. A dispersion model for each river would then
have been necessary to estimate the correct distance to include in the calculation for each plant. These models
are lacking.
10
Finally, we have constructed a general index of environmental pressure for each
river in which pulp and paper plants are discharging their effluents. We expect
that the higher the environmental pressure, the more damaging could be a plants
effluents, and therefore the greater the probability of an inspection. We first
calculated the following ratio: ((industrial wastewater discharges + domestic
wastewater discharges) / flow of the river). We then have constructed an index
ZONE which gives a value between 1 and 5 to the ratio calculated above with 1
representing an area of low pressure, and 5 an area of very high pressure.
We have also included a variable INCOME which measures the average
household income within 100 km of the plant. We expect that the higher the level
of income, the greater the demand for a cleaner environment, and the larger the
probability of monitoring of the plants environmental performance. It is
interesting to note that this variable may give support to both theories of
regulation. Following the public interest theory of regulation, ceteris paribus
higher levels of income give rise to a higher valuation of the environmental
damages and therefore to a smaller level of optimal pollution for any given levels
of abatement cost. On the other hand, following the economic theory of
regulation, communities with higher level of income may be more adept at
exercising pressure on the regulator to reduce pollution emissions (higher demand
for regulation).
COMPLIANCE is captured by the number of months that the plant was in
compliance with BOD and TSS standards during the last twelve months. We
therefore have two variables labeled COMPBOD and COMPTSS; they should
have a negative influence on the probability of an inspection.
As discussed previously, if the LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS
variables have a strong explanatory power, this would lend some support to the
11
economic theory of regulation, while if the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION and the
COMPLIANCE variables have more explanatory power, this would support the
public interest theory of regulation.
Finally, we consider two sets of CONTROL VARIABLES. The first one is
included to capture the differences in monitoring effort across administrative
regions. For this purpose, we use either REGIONAL DUMMIES or, as in Deily
and Gray, a variable labeled INSPREG which measures the total number of
inspections within a region in a given year. The second set of control variables is
included to capture omitted influences that may vary across time, but not across
regions. For instance, greater public awareness of environmental issues through
the period may have led to an increase in monitoring effort. These influences are
captured either by YEARLY DUMMIES or a TIME TREND.
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable,
14
we use the probit
model for our estimations.
15
Different specifications are presented with various
control variables. Furthermore, experimentations were conducted with different
lags of the FLOW variable up to (t-6). The justification for this lies on the
rationale that there may be a time lag between higher level of damages and the
timing of an inspection. This is particularly true when using monthly data, with
plants having to self-report their production and discharges data on a monthly
basis.
3. Empirical results
We have first estimated different combinations of the control variables to account
for regional effects (REGIONAL DUMMIES and INSPREG) and time
14
There is no plant in our sample that hadmore than one inspection in a given month.
15
We have tested a probit model with fixed effects (unconstrained model) by adding 45 dummies
for plants, 11 dummies for months, and 6 dummies for years. None of these variables were
statistically significant. We have also conducted a test of maximum likelihood. Results have shown
that the unconstrained model was not preferable to the constrained version presented here.
12
(YEARLY DUMMIES and TIME TREND). With respect to regional effects,
REGIONAL DUMMIES appeared to be never significant while INSPREG was
always statistically significant. We thus present results using INSPREG. With
respect to time, both YEARLY DUMMIES and TIME TREND were not
significant. However, models with YEARLY DUMMIES were always performing
better and we therefore keep this specification (results from various specifications
are presented in Appendix 1).
Results are presented in Table 2. The first specification is a version analogous to
Deily and Gray (1991) omitting the variables that capture the damage of
pollution. the result of our basic model. The following specifications include
various lags of the FLOW variable: FLOWt (2); FLOWt-1 (3); FLOWt-2 (4);
FLOWt-3 (5); FLOWt-4 (6). Results show that the explanatory power of the model
is relatively high with a percentage of correct predictions above 80%. For the
purpose of our discussion, we will focus on the last four specifications which offer
the largest percentage of correct predictions.
16
[ INSERT TABLE 2 ]
First note that the AGE variable is never significant and that its sign is unstable.
To the extent that this variable may be use as a proxy for the cost of compliance,
this result would indicate that the regulator does not consider compliance costs
when allocating its monitoring resources across plants. It is interesting to note that
Deily and Gray (1996) obtain a result of a similar nature. With respect to the
variables pertaining to LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, we observe that
the coefficient of the EMPL variable is always positive and statistically significant
thus indicating that the more important the plant is in the local labor market, or in
other words the more visible is the plant, the greater the probability of
16
For these specifications, we have also tested a logit version of the model. Results were of a
similar nature and the percentage of correct predictions almost identical.
13
inspections: an increase of 1% in the variable EMPL increases the probability of
inspection by 0.1135 %. As pointed out earlier, Deily and Gray (1991) obtained a
contrary result. We explain this difference by noting that Deily and Gray included
in their analysis (added together) both monitoring and enforcement activities
while we here consider solely the impact of monitoring activities. If enforcement
activities mainly explain the result obtained by Deily and Gray, the combination
of our results with theirs would indicate that the regulator undertakes monitoring
activities where its actions may be most visible (thus indicating an inclination to
protect environmental quality), but remains reluctant to impose enforcement
actions on those some plants which may be more adept at challenging the
regulator or, as suggested by Deily and Gray, whose closure would be most
disrupting to the local labor market.
The coefficient of our variable UNEMPL is as expected of a negative sign, and
statistically significant for most specifications: the larger the level of
unemployment in a region, the smaller the probability of inspections. Deily and
Gray (1991) somewhat surprisingly obtained the converse result. They explain
their result by suggesting that to the extent that high-unemployment areas tend to
be more populous or more polluted, the benefits from reducing emissions in such
areas may be greater (p. 270).
With respect to the variables capturing the impact of DAMAGE OF
POLLUTION, the coefficient of the variable FLOW is positive as we predicted
using the public interest theory of regulation, and is statistically significant when
the variable is lagged 3 or 4 periods: an increase of 1% in the value of the ratio
increase the probability of inspections by 0.00089. The maximization of social
welfare would indeed indicate that plants whose discharges may create higher
environmental damages face a higher probability of inspections. We cannot
clearly explain why only the lagged value of the FLOW variable is significant. We
14
note however that there is typically a period of a few months between the time
when plants submit their discharge reports and the time when this information
becomes available to local enforcers for actions.
Coefficients of the variables INCOME and ORGANO are never significant. The
coefficient on the variable POPAVAL is unexpectedly negative and in most
circumstances not significant. This indicates to us that a more precise proxy for
the potential damages caused by a plants effluent would need to be developed in
order to test more precisely the impact of damages on monitoring activities. In
this particular instance, we suggest that the use of the portion of each river along
which pulp and paper plants are discharging should be precisely documented and
analysed.
The variable capturing the number of months that the plant was in compliance
with BOD environmental standards in the previous 12 months, COMPBOD, is
sometimes significant with the expected negative sign: a greater frequency of non-
compliance with BOD standards increases the probability of inspections.
However, the variable COMPTSS has an unexpected positive sign but is never
significant. This may suggest that the performance of a plant with respect to BOD
is more likely to influence the regulators behavior than its performance with
respect to TSS (a similar result is found in Laplante and Rilstone (1996)). It also
suggests that inspections are not purely random and that they tend to be
concentrated where non-compliance (with BOD standards) is more important, as
suggested by Silverman (1990).
This evidence suggests that both the public interest theory of regulation and the
economic theory of regulation contribute to explain the decision of the regulator to
monitor the environmental performance of regulated plants. In a sense, such
results indicate pragmatically that both theories may be complementary, or that
15
the "real" world is neither totally black or totally white. This contrasts with the
results presented by Kaserman et al. (1993) whose empirical test strongly supports
the economic theory of regulation.
4. Conclusion
Though environmental regulations impose uniform standards on plants that
are facing heterogeneous local conditions (such as environmental damages
and labor market conditions), results in this paper suggest that the
monitoring of those standards is responsive to this heterogeneity. Ceteris
paribus, plants whose emissions are most likely to impose high
environmental damages are facing a higher probability of being inspected;
similarly, the probability of an inspection appears to be an increasing
function of the visibility of the plant and a decreasing function of the
regional unemployment rate. We do believe that these results offer important
insights into the regulators behavior. First, it does suggest that regulators,
facing limited resources, do not blindly enforce uniform standards as set and
required by environmental regulation: ceteris paribus, monitoring effort is
likely to be higher where environmental damages are higher. This result
would suggest that it may be less costly to set (sub-optimal) uniform
standards and let enforcers take care of the specificies of local conditions,
instead of setting standards that reflect those specificities and letting no room
to the enforcers to deviate from the standards. Secondly, we have shown that
regulators do respond to both the visibility of the plant in the region as well
as local labor market conditions. This result complements the result obtained
by Deily and Gray (1991): regulators appear to monitor larger plants for
visibility of their actions (and thus satisfy a subset of the electorate), but
avoid enforcing the regulation for those larger plants (thus satisfying another
subset of the electorate).
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APPENDIX 1
Further empirical results
(Pr > Chi-squared)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT -2.3301
(0.0018)
-2.2477
(0.0094)
-2.3954
(0.0747)
-1.1634
(0.4382)
AGE -0.00023
(0.9269)
-0.00048
(0.8528)
0.000533
(0.8476)
-0.00012
(0.9664)
UNEMPL -0.0601
(0.0328)
-0.0676
(0.0230)
-0.0907
(0.0087)
-0.1359
(0.0008)
EMPL 0.0228
(0.0005)
0.0233
(0.0004)
0.0225
(0.0074)
0.0217
(0.0075)
COMPTSS 0.0179
(0.2721)
0.0245
(0.1975)
0.00199
(0.9008)
0.0213
(0.2830)
COMPBOD -0.251
(0.1355)
-0.0228
(0.2067)
-0.0268
(0.0957)
-0.0242
(0.1768)
INSPREG 0.3316
(0.0001)
0.3653
(0.0001)
- -
REG1 - - 0.3594
(0.4221)
0.2936
(0.5146)
REG2 - - 0.2248
(0.5267)
0.2176
(0.5500)
REG3 - - -0.3488
(0.3642)
-0.5580
(0.1645)
REG4 - - -0.0911
(0.7970)
-0.2263
(0.5333)
REG5 - - 0.2306
(0.6039)
-0.0835
(0.8564)
REG6 - - -0.4644
(0.2759)
-0.5188
(0.2363)
REG7 - - -0.2704
(0.5751)
-0.1529
(0.7524)
REG8 - - -0.3096
(0.4437)
-0.2755
(0.5070)
INCOME 0.000015
(0.4493)
6.755E-6
(0.7584)
0.00005
(-0.0072)
0.000012
(0.7528)
TREND -0.00555
(0.1580)
- -0.0072
(0.2393)
-
YEAR85 - 0.2308
(0.4235)
- 0.6834
(0.0254)
YEAR86 - -0.00625
(0.9807)
- 0.3248
(0.2093)
YEAR87 - 0.1869
(0.4819)
- 0.0290
(0.9132)
YEAR89 - -0.2591
(0.4241)
- -0.4796
(0.1331)
YEAR90 - -0.3150
(0.2402)
- 0.3390
(0.1753)
YEAR91 - -0.0737
(0.8068)
- 0.2113
(0.5292)
FLOW (t-4) 13.6256
(0.0008)
14.5539
(0.0004)
16.2489
(0.0001)
15.1007
(0.0002)
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APPENDIX 1 (contd)
ORGANO -0.1045
(0.5698)
-0.1075
(0.5653)
-0.1124
(0.5467)
-0.1598
(0.4097)
POPUL -4.9E-6
(0.1422)
-4.65E-6
(0.1651)
-3.82E-6
(0.2486)
-3.7E-6
(0.2778)
ZONE -0.0922
(0.2457)
-0.1088
(0.1789)
-0.1462
(0.0714)
-0.1339
(0.0961)
% correct
predictions
83.3% 84% 72.3% 77.6%
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TABLE 1
Variable definitions, means, and standard deviations
Variable Definition Mean Standard
deviation
INSP Number of inspections
per month at plant i.
0.02 0.12
AGE Number of years of
production by plant i.
63.74 32.49
UNEMPL Unemployment rate in the
economic region where
the plant is located.
11.43 3.20
EMPL Number of employees
hired by the plant divided
by total employment
within a circumference of
100 km of the plant (in
thousands) x 100.
5.72 8.54
COMPTSS Number of months within
the previous 12 months in
which the plant complied
with TSS standards.
6.79 5.00
COMPBOD Number of months within
the previous 12 months in
which the plants complied
with BOD standards.
6.74 5.05
INSPREG Total number of
inspections per year made
in the administrative
region where the plant is
located, excluding
inspections at the plant.
0.98 1.14
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TABLE 1 (contd)
Variable Definition Mean Standard
deviation
REGIONAL
DUMMIES
Dummy variable equals
to 1 if located in the
region, 0 otherwise
(Region 9 is omitted
from estimation):
Region 1
Region 2
Region 3
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6
Region 7
Region 8
Region 9
0.11
0.13
0.15
0.20
0.07
0.13
0.11
0.07
0.04
0.31
0.34
0.36
0.40
0.25
0.34
0.31
0.25
0.20
TREND TREND = 1 for
01/1985, =2 for
02/1985, and so forth.
42.50 24.25
ANNUAL
DUMMIES
1988 is ommited for
estimation.
0.14 0.35
INCOME Average annual
household income
within 100 km
circumference of the
plant.
34 185 4 715
ORGANO Dummy variable to
capture the presence of
organochlorides in the
effluent. Variable = 1 if
contains; 0 otherwise.
0.02 0.35
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TABLE 1 (contd)
POPUL Population of the city if
the plants discharges
are upstream the city. It
takes a value of 0 if
discharges are
downstream the city.
14 551.76 21 798.72
FLOW Ratio of flow of
effluents over flow of
river (m
3
/sec).
0.009 0.032
ZONE Polytomic variable
taking a value between 1
and 5. 1 represents a
zone where total
environmental pressure
on a river is low, and 5
where it is very high.
1.5681 1.053
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TABLE 2
Empirical Results
(Pr > Chi-squared)
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INTERCEPT -1.7070
(0.0173)
-1.5951
(0.0437)
-1.9481
(0.0119)
-1.9375
(0.0118)
-2.2590
(0.0036)
AGE 0.00186
(0.3473)
-0.0023
(0.2911)
-0.00107
(0.6209)
-0.00139
(0.5202)
0.00002
(0.9915)
UNEMPL -0.0670
(0.0056)
-0.0603
(0.0363)
-0.0561
(0.0481)
-0.0597
(0.0346)
-0.0536
(0.0624)
EMPL 0.0225
(0.0001)
0.0242
(0.0001)
0.0239
(0.0001)
0.0219
(0.0005)
0.0230
(0.0004)
COMPTSS 0.0154
(0.3342)
0.0196
(0.2738)
0.0233
(0.1974)
0.0221
(0.2174)
0.0271
(0.1439)
COMPBOD -0.0154
(0.3342)
-0.00691
(0.6727)
-0.0094
(0.5733)
-0.0102
(0.5337)
-0.0135
(0.4284)
INSPREG 0.3581
(0.0001)
0.3520
(0.0001)
0.3397
(0.0001)
0.3369
(0.0001)
0.3392
(0.0001)
INCOME -9.4E-6
(0.5968)
-0.00001
(0.4511)
-9.17E-6
(0.6326)
-6.7E-6
(0.7262)
-3.9E-6
(0.8378)
YEAR85 0.1629
(0.5346)
0.1789
(0.5146)
0.2281
(0.4072)
0.2018
(0.4645)
0.3344
(0.2323)
YEAR86 -0.0768
(0.7481)
-0.1290
(0.6019)
-0.1062
(0.6653)
-0.0875
(0.7201)
-0.1042
(0.6732)
YEAR87 0.0737
(0.7705)
0.0943
(0.7144)
0.0769
(0.7642)
0.0808
(0.7517)
0.0694
(0.7873)
YEAR89 -0.1254
(0.6642)
-0.2421
(0.4364)
-0.2721
(0.3782)
-0.2765
(0.3684)
-0.3208
(0.3098)
YEAR90 -0.2076
(0.3848)
-0.1985
(0.4159)
-0.2114
(0.3864)
-0.2134
(0.3817)
-0.2645
(0.2857)
YEAR91 0.0750
(0.7740)
0.0553
(0.8425)
0.00926
(0.9732)
0.00369
(0.9893)
-0.0202
(0.9414)
FLOW - -9.1933
(0.1770)
2.0440
(0.6173)
1.7193
(0.6823)
8.8449
(0.0081)
ORGANO - - - - -
POPUL - - - - -
ZONE - - - - -
% correct
predictions
81.2% 80.6% 80.5% 80.0% 83.1%
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TABLE 2 (contd)
VARIABLE (6) (7) (8) (9)
INTERCEPT -2.4927
(0.0020)
-2.4975
(0.0022)
-2.8672
(0.0007)
-2.2477
(0.0094)
AGE 0.00025
(0.9118)
0.00063
(0.7940)
0.00062
(0.7969)
-0.00048
(0.8528)
UNEMPL -0.0456
(0.1214)
-0.0480
(0.1085)
-0.0448
(0.1350)
-0.0676
(0.0230)
EMPL 0.0218
(0.0011)
0.0213
(0.0019)
0.0224
(0.0012)
0.0233
(0.0004)
COMPTSS 0.0214
(0.2509)
0.0234
(0.2167)
0.0217
(0.2479)
0.0245
(0.1975)
COMPBOD -0.0198
(0.0255)
-0.0217
(0.2257)
-0.0246
(0.1804)
-0.0228
(0.2067)
INSPREG 0.3520
(0.0001)
0.3649
(0.0001)
0.3760
(0.0001)
0.3653
(0.0001)
INCOME 6.42E-7
(0.9742)
-8.16E-9
(0.9997)
0.000013
(0.5507)
6.75E-6
(0.7584)
YEAR85 0.3130
(0.2734)
0.2941
(0.3107)
0.3005
(0.2998)
0.2308
(0.4235)
YEAR86 -0.0500
(0.8431)
-0.0574
(0.8216)
-0.00971
(0.9698)
-00.625
(0.9807)
YEAR87 0.1376
(0.6010)
0.1465
(0.5792)
0.1561
(0.5592)
0.1869
(0.4817)
YEAR89 -0.2521
(0.4316)
-0.2529
(0.4343)
-0.2523
(0.4362)
-0.2591
(0.4241)
YEAR90 -0.2547
(0.3240)
-0.2960
(0.2620)
-0.3261
(0.2209)
-0.3150
(0.2402)
YEAR91 -0.0711
(0.8076)
-0.0729
(0.8053)
-0.1483
(0.6252)
-0.0737
(0.8068)
FLOW 9.2607
(0.0050)
11.1915
(0.0005)
11.2020
(0.0005)
14.5539
(0.0004)
ORGANO - -0.0239
(0.8925)
-0.1123
(0.5496)
-0.1075
(0.5653)
POPUL - - -6.7E-6
(0.0716)
-4.6E-6
(0.1651)
ZONE - - - -0.1088
(0.1789)
% correct
predictions
83.6% 83.9% 85.2% 84.0%
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